

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 3657

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DATA STUDIES

REF: A. USNATO 3221 DTG 111030Z JUNE 75

B. USNATO 3356 DTG 201430Z JUNE 1975

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT MBFR STAFF GROUP PAPER ENTITLED " MBFR DATA BASIS OF COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTH," AC/276-WP(75)13(REVISED). THIS DRAFT REPLACES PART OF PREVIOUS EFFORT ENTITLED " ASSESSMENT AND PUBLICATION OF FORCE STRENGTHS" (REF A). SECOND PART OF PREVIOUS DRAFT WAS ISSUED AS ANOTHER PAPER ON " BASIC RECURRING MBFR DATA PUBLICATIONS" (REF B).

2. THIS DRAFT, WHICH WAS PREPARED BY THE SGDS CHAIRMAN BRANSON ON THE BASIS OF WG COMMENTS AT THE JULY 1 SESSION , OUTLINES THE VARYING NATIONAL APPROACHES TOWARD COMPILING NATO SECRET

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STRENGTH FIGURES (PARA 3.C.(2)), EXPLAINS HOW NATO ASSESSES WP STRENGTH FIGURES (PARAS 4 AND 5) AND POINTS OUT THE PITFALLS IN ATTEMPTS TO COMPARE THE TWO SETS OF DATA (PARAS 6 AND 7).

3. THE PREVIOUS ATTEMPT TO RECOMMEND POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE METHODS USED BY THE ALLIES TO COUNT NATO STRENGTH FIGURES (PARAS 11 THROUGH 13 OF TEXT IN REF A) HAS BEEN DROPPED IN FAVOR OF A SHORT SECTION (PARAS 8 THROUGH 10 OF CURRENT DRAFT) OUTLINING THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE CHANGES.

4. THE ATTEMPT IN PARAS 14 AND 16 OF THE EARLIER DRAFT REF A) TO ASSESS THE NEGOTIABILITY OF NATOS COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS WAS REJECTED STRONGLY BY THE BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) AS EDGING INTO PROBLEMS WHICH SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SPC OR AHG. THE CURRENT DRAFT INCLUDES ONLY SOME MODEST ASSUMPTIONS ON NEGOTIABILITY IN THE LEAD-IN TO PARA 11 WHICH HAVE SATISFIED THE BELGIAN REP.

5. THE " CONCLUSIONS" OF THE PREVIOUS DRAFT HAVE NOW BECOME " FINDINGS" (PARA 11) WHICH BASICALLY ENDORSE THE CURRENT NATO METHODS OF DETERMING BOTH NATO AND WP STRNEGTH FIGURES AND POINT OUT THAT THE STRENGTH FIGURES FOR TH TWO SIDES ARE NOT DIRECTLY COMPARABLE.

6. BECAUSE THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EARLIER VERSIONS OF THIS DRAFT STUDY HAVE EVAPORATED,THE WG CHARMAN (GROUP CAPTAIN SMITH) NOW PLANS TO PROPOSE THAT THE PAPER BE ISSUED AS AN AGREED INTERNAL WG REFERENCE DOCUMENT, BUT THAT IT NOT BE FORWARDED TO THE SPC. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH IS ACCEPTABLE AS THE EXPLANATION OF NATO COUNTING MEHTODS IS STILLINFORMATIVE AND USEFUL, BUT THE PAPER NO LONGER REQUIRES ANY ACTION BY THE SPC. END COMMENT

7. ACTION REQUESTED:

- A. REQUEST COMMENTS ON CURRENT DRAFT TEXT STUDY (BELOW) AND
- B. REQUEST CONCURRENCE IN DRAFT TEXT ON " BASIC RECURRING MBFR DAT PUBLICATIONS" (REF B).

BEGIN TEXT:

AC/276-WP(75)13(REVISED)

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MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP
MBFR DATA- BASIS OF COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTH
DRAFT REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP

PURPOSE OF THE PAPER

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROVIDE A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DETERMINING MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE NGA.

BASIS OF COUNTING NATO FORCES

2. BACKGROUND TO NATO ADOPTING " ACTUAL STRENGTHS

A. IN 1971, THE STAFF GROUP SUBMITTED TO THE WORKING GROUP A SHORT PAPER(1) WHICH TOUKCHED ON SOME OF THE PROBLEMS

CONCERNING THE COUNTING OF MANPOWER FOR MBFR PURPOSES. THE ISSUE WAS AGAIN RAISED IN MID- 1972, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSTRAINTS SUB GROUP POSED THE QUESTION AS TO WHAT COUNTING METHOD WAS TO BE ADOPTED WHEN ADDRESSING FORCES SUBJECT TO MOVEMENT CONTRAINTS. A UK NOTE(2) IN ANSWER TO THE CONSTRAINTS PROBLEM, ILLUSTRATED THE ADVISABILITY OF USING " ACTUAL " VERSUS " WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS".

BEGIN FOOTNOTES

(1) AC/276-WP(71)6, 12TH MARCH, 1971

(2) AC/276-WP(72)24, 29TH MAY, 1972

END FOOTNOTES

B. FOLLOWING MUCH DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS TO BE USED IN COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTHS, THE WORKING GROUP WERE OF THE OPINION THAT ONLY ACTIVE DUTY FORCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN AS FAR AS MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WERE CONCERNED. THE WORKING GROUP SUBMITTED THE REASONS FOR THIS CHOICE AS PART OF REPORT TO THE COUNCIL(1) AND INCLUDED THE FACT THAT THE US RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON THE MATTER. THIS REPORT WAS APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL(2) FOR TRANSMISSION TO MINISTERS. THE RELEVANT PART OF THE REPORT READS AS FOLLOWS:

" WE ARE AGREED THAT, WHILE IT IS NECESSARY FOR NATO

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ALLIES NEGOTIATORS AND SUPPORTING STAFFS TO BE FULLY INFORMED OF WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS AND OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS AND ACUTAL STRENGTHS AT M-DAY, IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL NOR POLITIC TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS. SINCE ACTUAL STRENGTHS FOR NATO ARE GENERALLY LOWER THAN WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS, SMALL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FROM A BASEOF WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS MIGHT IN SOME CASES NOT RESULT IN ANY REDUCTIONS ACTUALLY BEING CARRIED OUT, WHICH WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF MBFR. MOREOVER, THE USE OF WAR AUTHORIZED

BEGIN FOOTNOTES

(1) AC/276-D(72)6, 16TH NOVEMBER, 1972

(2) C-M(72)81(REVISED), 27TH NOVEMBER, 1972

END FOOTNOTES

STRENGTHS IN NEGOTIATIONS COULD REVEAL INFORMATION OF GREAT BALUE TO A POTENTIAL ENEMY AND,FURTHER, COULD RESTRICT THE ALLIES POWERS, AFTER AN AGREEMENT WAS ATTAINED, TO MAKE DEFENCE PLANS TO MEET CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE, THEREFORE, CONTINUING OUR TECHNICAL STUDIES ON THE APPROACH TO MBFR, ON THE UNDERSTNANDING THAT EXPLORATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WILL DISCUSS REDUCTIONS IN ACTUAL STRENGTHS."

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3. FACTORE BEARING ON THE USE OF" ACTUAL STRENGTHS"

A. EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED STRENGTH. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP ACCEPTED 31 ST DECEMBER AS THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED STRENGTH BECAUSE THE DATES FOR THE INTAKE AND RELEASE OF CONSCRIPTS VARIES BETWEEN COUNTIES, EXCEPT AT THE END OF THE YEAR AT WHICH TIME THE SITUATION IS MORE STABEL. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF CHRISTMAS/NEW YEAR HOLIDAYS A NUMBER OF CONSCRIPTS ARE RELEASED IN MID TO LATE DECEMBER,AND THE NEW INTAKE NOT PROCESSED UNTIL EARLY JANUARY, UNLIKE THE NORMAL PROACTICE OF COMBINING THE TWO OPERATIONS ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY; CONSEQUENTLY, THE " ACTUAL STRENGTH" AS AT 31ST DECEMBER, IF CORRECTLY REPORTED BY THOSE COUNTIRES HAVING CONSCRIPTS, WOULD REFLECT A LOWER STRENGTH THAN AT OTHER TIMES OF THE YEAR. THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLATING NATO DATA, WILL INVESTIGATE AT THE NEXT DATA MANAGEMENT AND FORCES ANALYSIS MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR LATE AUTUMN,THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF CHANGING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED STRENGTH FROM THAT OF 31ST DECEMBER TO A DATE ON WHICH THE RELEASE OR INTAKE OF

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CONSCRIPTS DOES NOT OCCUR AND WHCIH COINCIDES WITH THE EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF REPORTED WARSAW PACT ESTIMATE STRENGTHS (IE MID-YEAR) AS PUBLISHED FOLLOWING THE MC 224 CONFERENCE.

B. DEFINITION OF "PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY IN PEACETIME (NATO FORCES)". " THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY IN UNITS AS AT 31ST DECEMBER. PERSONNEL ON COURSES, LEAVE, TEMPORARY DUTY, IN HOSPITAL ETC., BUT CHARGED AGAINST UNIT OR FORMATION STRENGTH ARE TO BE INCLUDED"(1).

C. ANNUAL STRENGTH RETURNS- NATO GROUND FORCES

(1) IN NOVEMBER, THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF REQUESTS NATIONS TO SUBMIT BY END FEBRUARY THE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO UPDATE DATA HELD AT THE NATO FORCE PLANNING DATA BASE (IS). SOME MODS, ANTICIPATING THIS REQUEST, START PREPARING THEIR ACTUAL STRENGTH RETURNS IN NOVEMBER WITH THE RESULT THAT THE " ACTUAL STRENGTH" REPORTED BY THEM FOR PERIOD 31 ST DECEMBER (SEE A. ABOVE) IS OFTEN AN ESTIMATE.

(2) THE BASIS OF COUNTING ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL DIFFERS BETWEEN NATO COUNTRIES:

BEGIN FOOTNOTE

(1) AC/276(SGDS)-N/18(3RD REVISE), 30TH OCTOBER, 1974

END FOOTNOTE

(I) BELGIUM REPORTS ITS TRUE "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER". IN OTHER WORDS, IT DOES NOT INCLUDE IN ITS COMPUTATIONS THE ESTIMATED INTAKE OF JANUARY CONSCRIPTS AND ITS REPORTED FIGURE COULD BE ON THE LOW SIDE.

(II) THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES ARE INTEGRATED AND NOT IDENTIFIABLE AS PURELY GROUND OR AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, FOR MBFR PURPOSES OTTAWA DECIDED ON A BREAKDOWN OF ITS FORCES IN THE NGA IN THE DESIRED MANNER. CANADA REPORTS ITS "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER". THESE FIGURES WHEN ROUNDED TAKE CARE OF MINOR FLUCTUATIONS. THE FIGURES GIVEN CAN BE CONSIDERED AS BEING AN ACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER", AND CONSISTENT WITH ACTUAL STRENGTH LEVELS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

(III) THE ONLY OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON FRANCE FORCES IN THE NGA IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ANNUAL NATIONAL RETURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF: DRC/N(FRANCE). THIS FIGURE SHOULD ONLY
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BE REGARDED AS A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF " ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER".

(IV) THE FRG PROVIDES A " MEAN STRENGTH" WHICH LIES AT SOME POINT BETWEEN ITS PEAK AND LOWEST ACTUAL STRENGTH REACHED IN THE COURSE OF THE CALENDAR YEAR.

(V) LUXEMBOURG PROVIDES ITS TRUE "ACTUAL STRENGTH" AS AT 31 ST DECEMBER. THE STRENGTH REMAINS CONSTANT THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

(VI) THE NETHERLANDS PREPARE THEIR ANNUAL STRENGTH RETURN IN EARLY DECEMBER IN ORDER TO AVOID THE FLUCTUATIONS WHICH OCCUR DURING THE END OF DECEMBER PERIOD AND EXCLUDE 7,000 PERSONNEL ON " SHORT LEAVE" IN THEIR GROUND FORCE MAN-

POWER STRENGTH. THE RESULTING GROUND FORCE FIGURE IS REPORTED AS THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31 DECEMBER" AND CAN BE CONSIDERED AS BEING THE "MEAN STRENGTH" OF NL FORCES IN THE CALENDAR YEAR.

(VII) THE UK PREPARES ITS ANNUAL STRENGTH RETURN IN NOVEMBER. THE RETURN TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION SUCH FLUCTUATIONS AS MAY OCCUR DURING DECEMBER- JANUARY PERIOD AND INCLUDES PERSONNEL ON UNIT STRENGTH WHO ARE TEMPORARILY ABSENT ON DUTY FROM THE NGA. THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH REPORTED AS AT 31 DECEMBER" CAN BE CONSIDERED AS BEING AN ACCURATE FIGURE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NORMAL STRENGTH THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

(VIII) THE US SUBMITS IN ITS RETURN THE "PEACETIME AUTHORIZED STRENGTH" OF ITS FORCES IN THE NGA- A FIGURE WHICH COULD DIFFER FROM THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31 DECEMBER" AND COULD BE SAID TO REPRESENT A PEAK STRENGTH FOR THE YEAR.

3. FROM THE ABOVE IT WILL BE EVIDENT THAT THE AGGREGATE FIGURE FOR NATOS FORCE STRENGTH IN THE NGA WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED IN VIENNA, MAY NOT, STRICTLY SPEAKING, REPRESENT NATOS "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31 DECEMBER".

NATO ASSESSMENT OF WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS

4. NATOS ASSESSMENT OF WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE STRENGTHS IS ARRIVED AT AS A RESULT OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES(1) AT NATO HEADQUARTERS. IN ESTIMATING THESE STRENGTHS THE PEACETIME READINESS AND MANNING LEVELS OF UNITS ARE CONSIDERED. THE RESULTING ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON A COMPROMISE OF NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS. DUE TO THIS COMPROMISE, THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, IMS, IS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBLE MARGIN OF ERROR IN THE NATO AGREED FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT MANPOWER STRENGTHS; BUT, THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
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RECOGNISE THAT VARIATIONS DO EXIST BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF MANPOWER STRENGTHS. FOR EXAMPLE: THE GROUND FIGURES REPRESENT NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN DIVISIONS BETWEEN 2PCT AND 5 PCT FOR SOME INDIVIDUAL UNITS LESS EASILY OBSERVED THE DISCREPANCY COULD AMOUNT TO 10PCT. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS ON THE OPINION (2) THAT THE ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NGA MAY BE SUBJECT TO ERROR AS HIGH AS 10 PCT.

5. THE WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES AT VIENNA HAVE CHALLENGED NATO AGREED ESTIMATES OF PACT MANPOWER AND TANK STRENGTHS IN THE NGA; HOWEVER, UNTIL THE BASIC COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS USED BY THE WARSAW PACT ARE KNOWN, COMPARISONS BETWEEN NATO AGREED FIGURES AND PACT CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN.

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(1) MC 224 TO&E CONFERENCE HELD ANNUALLY IN SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AD HOC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (MBFR), AND THE MC 161 INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE HELD ANNUALLY IN MARCH.

(2) AC/276-D(74)8, PARAGRAPH 16

END FOOTNOTES

COMPARISON BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT "ACTUAL STRENGTHS"

6. IN ADDITION TO THE DIFFERENT BASES OF COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTHS AS OUTLINES IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 ABOVE, THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED NATO AND WARSAW PACT MANPOWER STRENGTHS IS DIFFERENT. WHEREAS THE NATO REPORTED STRENGTH IS UP-TO-DATE, THAT REPORTED FOR WARSAW PACT WILL ALWAYS BE OUT OF DATE IN REAL TIME TERMS. THUS TO THE MARGIN OF ERROR RECOGNISED BY THE INTELLIGENCE
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AUTHORITIES (SEE PARA 4) MUST BE ADDED AN ALLOWANCE TO CATER FOR ADDITIONAL CHANGES IN WARSAW PACT STRENGTH IN THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD WHICH MIGHT BE AS MUCH AS ONE YEAR.

7. FLUCTUATIONS IN MANPOWER STRENGTHS OCCUR IN THE NGA DURING THE YEAR AS A RESULT OF CONSCRIPTION AND OF TROOP ROTATIONS. IN NATO, THE TIME PERIOD FOR PROCESSING CONSCRIPTS DIFFERS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. THE SYSTEM AND TIME PERIOD FOR THE ROTATION OF TROOPS ALSO DIFFERS. THE SAME DIFFERENCES ARE APPLICABLE WHEN COMPARING NATO FLUCTUATIONS WITH THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. IT MIGHT BE SIMPLER TO ACCOUNT FOR VARIATIONS TO MANPOWER STRENGTHS RESULTING

FROM CONSCRIPTION AND TROOP ROTATIONS OTHER THAN TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE CURRENT SYSTEMS OF COUNTING MANPOWER. TO EXAMINE THIS POSSIBILITY A SEPARATE STUDY HAS BEEN STARTED ON THE "EXCEPTIONS REQUIRED FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR TRAINING, EXERCISES, ROTATIONS AND OTHER FLUCTUATIONS DURING A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND AFTER AN MBFR PHASE II AGREEMENT".

POSSIBLE BASIC COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS FOR NATO FORCES

8. CURRENT FIGURES FOR NATO'S OWN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTH WHICH HAVE BEEN TABLED IN VIENNA ARE THOSE ARRIVED AT BY THE PROCESS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3(C)(1). FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH 3(C)(2) THESE FIGURES CANNOT STRICTLY SPEAKING BE DESCRIBED AS "ACTUAL STRENGTH" FIGURES. THEY COULD BE MORE CORRECTLY DESCRIBED AS THE "NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH" OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL IN THE NGA AT THE DATE OF CALCULATION AND THROUGHOUT THE CALENDAR YEAR IN QUESTION.

9. HOWEVER, AN "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY COUNT" PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED, EVEN IF THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY ALL THE NATIONS CONCERNED, WOULD BE VALID ONLY AT THE DATE CHOSEN. UNLESS THIS COMPLICATED EXERCISE WERE CONDUCTED MONTHLY, THERE WOULD NECESSARILY BE VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE FIGURES STATED BY THE ALLIES TO THE EAST AND THE ACTUAL NUMBERS OF MEN ON THE GROUND. THERE WOULD BE NO APPARENT ADVANTAGE, AND HEAVY COST IN LABOUR, IN SUCH A MONTHLY COUNT, SINCE THE OBJECT OF PRODUCING THE MANPOWER FIGURE IS TO DECLARE IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST, WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NECESSARILY COVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD - AT LEAST OF SEVERAL MONTHS.

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10. THE COUNT ON THE PRESENT BASIS DOES PRODUCE A FIGURE WHICH CAN BE SUBSTANTIATED, EITHER BY PROKUCING NATIONAL FIGURES OR GROSSING UP THE ALLIED COMPONENTS (SEE WP(75)12). THE SUBSTANCE AND CONTENT OF THAT COUNT WOULD NOT CHANGE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, IF THE ALLIES WERE TO ADOPT THE DESCRIPTION "NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNT" RATHER THAN "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY COUNT".

FINDINGS

11. WHATEVER COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS ARE ADOPTED BY NATO FOR ITS OWN FORCES, THESE MAY HAVE TO BE EXPLAINED TO THE EAST. AS TO WHETHER THE EAST WILL ACCEPT OUR METHOD OF COUNTING REMAINS TO BE SEEN; SIMILARLY, NATO MIGHT NOT AGREE WITH THE EAST'S COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS; BUT IT MAY BE THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL SIMPLY EXCHANGE THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS AND THAT THIS EXCHANGE MAY IN FACT PROVE SATISFACTORY(1). WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT:

A. THE PRESENT SYSTEM PROVIDES A COUNT WHICH CAN BE SUBSTANTIATED AND ITS DESCRIPTION AS "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY COUNT" MEETS THE MBFR NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS AS PRESENTLY DEFINED. THE

EXISTING APPROACH IS WELL UNDERSTOOD AND THE MINOR DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN NATIONAL RESPONSES AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3(C)(2) ABOVE ARE KNOWN.

B. A CHANGE OF DEFINITION TO "NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTHS" WOULD NOT CHANGE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT THE SUBSTANCE AND CONTENT OF

(1) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PAPER, IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT NATO COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE EAST WITHOUT THE LATTER PROVIDING SIMILAR INFORMATION. FURTHERMORE, IT IS ASSUMED THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL DIVULGE ITS METHOD OF COUNTING THE OTHER SIDE'S MANPOWER STRENGTH.

THE COUNT ON THE PRESENT BASIS. THE ISSUE, THEREFORE, BECOMES ONE OF CHOICE BETWEEN DEFINITIONS OF THE BASE OF COUNT RATHER THAN ONE OF SUBSTANCE IN THE COUNT ITSELF.

C. NATO COULD CONTINUE TO ASSESS WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE STRENGTHS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING METHODS, I.E. ON ESTIMATED STRENGTHS AS SUMMARISED IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE.

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D. THE ALLIED FIGURES FOR ALLIED FORCES ARE NOT AND CANNOT BE DIRECTLY COMPARABLE WITH ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER: THE BASES OF ASSESSMENT ARE NECESSARILY DIFFERENT - NATO MANPOWER STRENGTHS BEING BASED ON AN ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY COUNT WHEREAS WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS ARE DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS; IN ADDITION, THERE WILL ALWAYS BE A TIME-LAG BETWEEN THE DATE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON WARSAW PACT FORCES AND ITS INCORPORATION INTO ALLIED AGREED INTELLIGENCE WHEREAS THE NATO COUNT IS UP-TO-DATE.

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